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Cleaning Up: Equitable Considerations in
the RCRA Citizen Suit Provision
Controversy
MICHELLE KOK MORITZ'
INTRODUCTION
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA") governs the
generation, treatment, disposal, storage, and transport of solid and hazardous
waste.' Congress designed RCRA to be a prospective act used to "prevent
improper disposal of hazardous wastes in the future."2 Prior to enacting RCRA,
Congress had devised legislation to regulate both air3 and water.' Without a
provision regulating the disposal of waste on land, however, these programs
carried additional burdens. As a House Commerce Committee Report observed,
"[t]he existing methods of land disposal often result in air pollution, subsurface
leachate and surface run-off, which affect air and water quality."' Conversely,
the Clean Water Act 6 and the Clean Air Act7 exacerbated the hazardous waste
problems on land because much of the hazardous material removed from smoke
stacks and navigable waters was distributed to public landfills and disposal sites.'
By adopting RCRA, Congress recognized the need for regulating the disposal of
hazardous waste on land.
As originally enacted, RCRA contained two types of citizen suit provisions.
First, citizens could bring suit against an EPA Administrator who failed to
perform any duties made mandatory by the Act? Second, citizens could bring
actions against persons in violation of any RCRA requirement.'0 In 1984,
Congress amended the RCRA citizen suit section, and furnished an additional
* J.D. Candidate, 1997, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., 1994,
Calvin College.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1994).
2. STAFF OF HOUSE SuBcoMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 96TH CONG., REPORT ON HAZARDOUS WASTE DIsPOsAL
31 (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter REPORT].
3. Clean Air Act of 1955, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994).
4. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1994). After
undergoing significant amendment in 1977, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act became
what is now the Clean Water Act. Id.
5. H.R. REP. No. 94-1491, at4 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6242.
6. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376.
7.42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671.
8. Id.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(2) ("[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his own behalf
... against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the administrator to perform
any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator.").
10. Id. § 6972(a)(1)(A) ("[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his own behalf.
against any person... who is alleged to be in violation of any permit, standard, regulation,
condition, requirement, prohibition, or order which has become effective pursuant to this
chapter .... ).
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provision which allows any person to commence a civil action against another
person or the government for RCRA violations. Specifically, § 6972(a)(1)(B)
establishes that persons may bring suit against any past or present generator,
operator, or owner "who has contributed or is contributing to the.., handling,
storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste
which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the
environment... ."" The section goes on to grant the district courts jurisdiction
to enforce RCRA regulations, restrain individual violators, and to order such
persons to take "such other action as may be necessary . ... ""
In the wake of RCRA, local health agencies ordered many private parties to
clean up various forms of contamination on their property. Often, these parties
were not responsible for the contamination, but nonetheless complied with the
government's instructions before trying to obtain reimbursement from the
responsible parties. Responsible parties, however, commonly refused to pay for
the contamination. In response, these landowners filed suit under §
6972(a)(1)(B), claiming that the phrase "to take such other action as may be
necessary" authorized the district courts to grant restitution of expended cleanup
costs.'
3
Many courts refused to recognize that RCRA provides a private cause of action
for money damages and denied these plaintiffs recovery. 4 More recently,
however, the Ninth Circuit held in KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig" that the
RCRA citizen suit provision does authorize the recovery of such cleanup costs.'6
The Eighth Circuit responded in Furrer v. Brown,'7 reaffirming previous
interpretations and criticizing the Ninth Circuit's analysis. This split in authority
made Supreme Court adjudication of the issue necessary. On March 19, 1996, the
Supreme Court held that the RCRA citizen suit provision does not permit private
citizens to recover past cleanup costs when no threat to health or the environment
exists at the time of suit."
The Supreme Court may have interpreted correctly the existing statutory
language of RCRA when concluding that the RCRA citizen suit provision does
not provide a private right to reimbursement. In reaching a different conclusion,
however, the Ninth Circuit correctly responded to what is intuitively a disturbing
result. Denying landowners any right to recover expended environmental cleanup
costs obstructs RCRA's purposes, punishes innocent and compliant landowners,
11. Id. § 6972(a)(1)(B).
12. Id. § 6972(a)(2).
13. See Commerce Holding Co. v. Buckstone, 749 F. Supp. 441, 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1990). In
Commerce, plaintiffs used the "take such other action as may be necessary" clause to argue that
the equitable relief (in the form of reimbursement for costs) that they sought was necessary to
remedy the result of defendants' illegal conduct, and therefore recoverable. Id.; see also
Kaufman & Broad-South Bay v. Unisys Corp., 822 F. Supp. 1468 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (Plaintiffs
were arguing that "such other action" included restitution of costs.).
14. See, e.g., Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1985); Portsmouth
Redev. & Hous. Auth. v. BMI Apartment Assocs., 847 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. Va. 1994).
15. 49 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 1995).
16. Id. at 521.
17. 62 F.3d 1092 (8th Cir. 1995).
18. Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1251, 1253 (1996).
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hinders cooperation between government agencies and citizens, wastes judicial
resources, improperly shifts responsibility from federal to state courts, and
unfairly distinguishes between government and private actors in like
circumstances. Due to these important equitable considerations, the Supreme
Court's "strict statutory construction" resolution cannot be the end of the RCRA
debate; RCRA reform is necessary. Part I of this Note describes the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits' treatment of the RCRA citizen suit controversy. Part II explains
the Supreme Court resolution. Part III explores the equitable concerns which
stem from the Supreme Court's treatment of the issue. Finally, Part IV discusses
the need for future legislative action and calls for RCRA reform.
I. THE EIGHTH AND NINTH CIRCUIT SPLIT
The factual situations of KFC Western and Furrer are quite similar. However,
each court's analysis and conclusion on the RCRA citizen suit provision
controversy differ.
A. The Eighth Circuit Decision: Furrer v. Brown
In Furrer v. Brown, the Eighth Circuit denied the plaintiff-landowners
monetary relief under § 6972(a)(1)(B), finding that the section provided no such
remedy. 9 In Furrer, the Browns and Fagases owned property which Shell Oil
Company once leased. The Browns subsequently sold that property to the
Furrers. In 1991, the Furrers became aware that their property was contaminated
by petroleum, and the Missouri Department of Natural Resources ordered the
Furrers to remediate the contamination." Upon completing the cleanup, the
Furrers sought to recover their costs from the Browns and Shell Oil under §
6972(a)(1)(B).
In denying plaintiffs relief, the Eighth Circuit first determined that §
6972(a)(1)(B) does not expressly grant courts the authority to award money
judgments for past cleanup costs. 2' However, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged
that the Supreme Court "has long recognized that private rights of action do not
require express statutory authorization."' Rather, courts may imply a cause of
action in federal statutes despite congressional failure to expressly provide for
one.' The Eighth Circuit thus concluded that in order for the Furrers to recover,
the court must find that Congress implicitly created in RCRA a monetary remedy
19. Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1101.
20. Id at 1092.
21. Id. at 1094.
22. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 26 (1979) (White, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
23. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clarnmers Ass'n, 453 U.S.
1 (1981); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,
442 U.S. 560 (1979).
1997]
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for past cleanup costs.24 To reach its conclusion, the Eighth Circuit applied the
four-pronged test established in Cort v. Ash.25
In Cort, the Supreme Court developed a four-pronged analysis designed to
determine whether to imply a private right of action in a federal statute?' The
analysis considers whether the plaintiff is a member of a class for whose benefit
the statute was enacted, whether there is evidence of legislative intent to create
or deny such a remedy, whether the overall purpose of the legislation comports
with granting the remedy, and whether the cause of action is one typically left to
the states.27 However, the Court has emphasized that all Cort factors are not of
equal importance. 28 Legislative intent (prong two) has become the crux of the
query: "The central inquiry remains whether Congress intended to create, either
expressly or by implication, a private cause of action."29 After applying the Cort
test, the Eighth Circuit concluded that Congress did not intend to make a
monetary remedy available under § 6972, and refused to imply a private right of
action for recovery of cleanup costs.3 The court found that RCRA § 6972 was
not enacted for the special benefit of the Furrers, that neither § 6972 nor its
legislative history indicates congressional intent to create the monetary remedy,
and that granting the monetary remedy fails to comport with RCRA's overall
purpose." Consequently, the court denied the Furrers' claim.
B. The Ninth Circuit Decision: KFC Western, Inc. v.
Meghrig
The Ninth Circuit, however, allowed private landowners to recover past
remediation costs. In KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, Alan and Margaret Meghrig
sold real property to KFC for the operation of a fried chicken franchise.32 Due
to the Meghrig's negligent operation of a gasoline station on the premises, the
property's soil was contaminated with the refined petroleum products lead and
benzene.33 At the time of sale, KFC was not aware of the contamination, but later
discovered pollutants while improving the property in 198804 The County of Los
Angeles Department of Health Services ordered KFC to abort all construction on
the property pending further soil analysis. Upon discovering elevated
contaminant levels in the soil, the Department ordered KFC to clean up the
24. Furrer, 62 F.3d at 1097.
25. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
26. Id. at 78-79.
27. Id.
28. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 23 (1979); Touche Ross,
442 U.S. at 575.
29. Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 575.
30. Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092, 1100 (8th Cir. 1995).
31. The Eighth Circuit decided that the fourth Cort factor-whether the cause of action is
one typically left to the states-was "at best a neutral factor and does nothing to advance the
case for finding an implied federal cause of action for the recovery of cleanup costs." Id.
32. KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518, 519 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1251
(1996).
33. Id.
34. Id.
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property to the tune of over $200,000."5 KFC asked the Meghrigs for
reimbursement for its expended costs, but the Meghrigs refused. Three years
after completing the cleanup, KFC brought suit against the Meghrigs under §
6972(a)(1)(B) to recover its costs.3 6
The district court granted the Meghrigs' motion to dismiss on the grounds that
the site no longer presented an imminent danger, and that the RCRA citizen suit
provision did not authorize the recovery of past environmental cleanup costs. The,
court emphasized that § 6972(a)(1)(B) permits "only injunctive or other equitable
relief and only in cases involving an existing, imminent danger to public health
or the environment."' KFC appealed.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, allowing KFC to recover its expended cleanup
costs. In reaching that result, the court addressed two issues. First, the court
considered whether an "imminent and substantial endangerment" must exist at
the time of cleanup or at the point of filing. Following the Eighth Circuit's
reasoning in United States v. Aceto Agricultural Chemicals Corp.,38 the Ninth
Circuit concluded that to sustain a lawsuit, the contamination at issue need only
pose an imminent and substantial danger at the time of cleanup.39 In Aceto, the
Eighth Circuit addressed the "imminent endangerment" requirement in RCRA §
6973, a provision which authorizes the EPA Administrator to bring suit for
expended costs.4" The Eighth Circuit stated that the requirement did not limit the
time for filing an action. Thus, the Administrator could recover for expended
costs after any imminent danger had subsided.4 Finding that the wording of §
6972 mirrored § 6973, the Ninth Circuit adopted the Aceto conclusion.42
Second, the court considered what remedies § 6972 (a)(1)(B) provided, and
determined that RCRA authorized a restitutionary remedy for plaintiffs like KFC.
In allowing KFC to recover, the Ninth Circuit concluded that RCRA's "take
other action as may be necessary" phrase granted the district courts jurisdiction
to award compensatory money damages. 3 The court again relied on the almost
identical language of §§ 6972 and 6973, and stated that Congress intended
citizen suits to be "governed by the same standards of liability as governmental
actions... ."4 The Court argued that it would be "unfair and poor public policy
to interpret § 6972(a)(1)(B) as barring restitution actions. 45
This disagreement between the Furrer and KFC Western courts gave rise to
Supreme Court adjudication of the § 6972 citizen suit controversy.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id at 520.
38. 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989).
39. KFC Western, 49 F.3d at 522.
40. Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1383.
41. Id.
42. KFC Western, 49 F.2d at 521.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 523.
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II. THE SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION: MEGHRIG V. KFC
WESTERN, INC.
In a unanimous decision authored by Justice O'Connor, the Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit and held that RCRA § 6972(a)(1)(B) does not permit "a private
cause of action to recover the prior cost of cleaning up toxic waste that does not,
at the time of suit, continue to pose an endangerment to health or the
environment.
4 6
The Court stated that KFC's claim must fail on two fronts.4" First, the Court
determined that § 6972(a)(1)(B) permits a citizen to bring suit only when the
toxic waste presents an "imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the
environment" at the time the suit is filed.48 The Court stated: "The meaning of
this timing restriction is plain: An endangerment can only be 'imminent' if it
'threaten[s] to occur immediately,' and the reference to waste which 'may
present' imminent harm quite clearly excludes waste that no longer presents such
a danger."49 Because KFC's land no longer posed any danger to the environment
(KFC cleaned up the land three years earlier), the Court rejected KFC's claim.
Because KFC's claim failed on this first issue, the Court need not have
addressed the further issue of whether § 6972 ever provides a reimbursement
remedy for past cleanup costs. However, the Court decided to reach this issue,
and concluded that § 6972 never provides such a remedy." The Court outlined
the two specific remedies found in § 6972: mandatory injunctions and
prohibitory injunctions.5 The Court concluded with little discussion that "neither
[remedy] contemplates the award of past cleanup costs, whether these are
denominated 'damages' or 'equitable restitution."' 52
Further, the Court compares § 6972 to analogous provisions in a similar
environmental statute, the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). 3 CERCLA, passed several years
46. Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1251, 1253 (1996).
47. Id. at 1254.
48. Id. (emphasis in original).
49. Id. at 1255 (citation omitted).
50. Id.
5 1. A mandatory injunction "orders a responsible party to 'take action' by attending to the
cleanup and proper disposal of toxic waste." Id. at 1254. A prohibitory injunction "'restrains'
a responsible party from further violating RCRA." Id.
52. Id. at 1254.
53. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994). CERCLA, which was amended in 1986 by the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, permits the EPA to clean up hazardous waste
sites and creates a"Superfund" to support the EPA's activities. See 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1994);
42 U.S.C. §§ 9604-05. The Superfuind is financed through industry taxes, appropriations, and
legal judgments recovered from those responsible for the contamination. See 26 U.S.C. §
9507(b). CERCLA places ultimate responsibility for hazardous site clean up on "those
responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poisons." Dedham Water Co. v.
Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v.
Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982)).
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after RCRA, addresses environmental concerns similar to those in RCRA, and
contains a "citizen suit" provision which mirrors 4 6972.5' However, CERCLA
also explicitly permits citizens to recover remediation costs: "[a]ny person may
seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable" for
cleanup costs." The Court then stated that Congress knows how to provide for
a monetary remedy when it intends to create one, and determined that Congress
did not intend for RCRA to provide such a remedy.16 Therefore, notwithstanding
the timing issue, the Court found KFC's claim for restitution of past cleanup
costs to be without merit.17 In addition, the Court discussed other aspects of
RCRA's enforcement scheme which indicate that "Congress did not intend for
a private citizen to be able to undertake a clean up and then proceed to recover
its costs under RCRA."' s The Court noted that RCRA contains no statute of
limitations, nor a requirement for showing that alleged cleanup costs are
reasonable. Further, RCRA dictates that citizens give ninety days notice to the
EPA Administrator before filing an enforcement action, and refuses to allow a
citizen suit once the EPA or the State commences an enforcement action.59 The
Court concluded that if Congress designed RCRA to "compensate private parties
for their past cleanup efforts, it would be a wholly irrational mechanism for
doing so.,60
KFC and the Furrers argued that courts should recognize an implied right of
action in RCRA for recovery of past remediation costs. The Supreme Court
refused to imply that right. The Court's reluctance to imply a private right of
action in RCRA reflects a concern grounded in the separation of powers:
Congress, not the courts, should control the availability of remedies under the
statutes.6' The multiple factors cited by the Court suggest that Congress did not
intend to provide a remedy for money damages in § 6972, particularly when no
endangerment to health or the environment exists at the time of suit. Established
Supreme Court doctrine dictates that absent a strong indicia of congressional
intent to create a certain remedy in a statute, that remedy should not be implied.62
Therefore, the Supreme Court clearly reached the "correct" result in Meghrig in
terms of traditional principles of statutory interpretation.
However, the Supreme Court decision gives rise to inequities which legislators
and citizens cannot ignore. While traditional methods of statutory interpretation
and the separation of powers doctrine ended the Supreme Court's inquiry, the
debate is far from over.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 9659(c).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).
56. Meghrig, 116 S. Ct. at 1254.
57. Id. at 1255.
58. Id. at 1256.
59. Id. at 1255.
60. Id.
61. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 n.9 (1990).
62. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clamnmers Ass'n, 453 U.S.
1, 15 (1981).
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III. EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS: UNRESOLVED
PROBLEMS IN MEGHRIG V. KFC WESTERN, INC.
By denying a private right of recovery to landowners like KFC and the Furrers,
Meghrig obstructs RCRA's purposes, punishes innocent and compliant
landowners, hinders cooperation between government agencies and citizens,
wastes judicial resources, improperly shifts responsibility from federal to state
courts, and unfairly distinguishes between government and private actors in like
circumstances. Therefore, the Supreme Court's adjudication of the citizen suit
issue simply cannot be the final word; RCRA reform is necessary.
A. Obstruction of RCRA
The Supreme Court's resolution of the issue frustrates RCRA's primary
objective of preventing future environmental harms through the expedient
remediation of contaminated land. By refusing to permit private recovery of past
cleanup costs under § 6972, the Court promotes noncompliance with RCRA
orders, thereby thwarting the fundamental purposes of RCRA.
According to Congress, the purpose of RCRA is to prevent future
environmental harms. 3 Congress enacted RCRA to ensure the expeditious
disposal and cleanup of existing hazardous waste so as to minimize the present
and future threat to human health and the environment: 4 However, by closing off
future monetary remedies, the Court guarantees future environmental harms
through noncompliance and delay. The Court emphasizes that toxic waste must
pose an "imminent and substantial endangerment to health or environment" at the
time a suit is filed." Obviously, landowners faced with an order from their local
department of health services soon will learn that it is more beneficial to delay
cleanup proceedings and instigate a lawsuit, rather than to speedily and willingly
comply with the environmental order 6 Every day these landowners spend
arguing for injunctions and negotiating arrangements for costs is another day
when no action is taken on the land, seriously compromising RCRA's intent to
prevent future harms. By encouraging lawsuits, rather than action, the Court
increases the potential for future environmental harms as toxic wastes spread
underground and leach toward water supplies. 7 The purposes of RCRA would
be better served by encouraging landowners-through the promise of future
reimbursement-to quickly comply with environmental cleanup orders.
63. REPORT, supra note 2, at 31.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b) (1994).
65. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
66. One environmental lawyer has suggested that citizens should first determine whether
cleanup costs can be recovered before cleaning up that contamination. He adds that citizens
should file suit against responsible parties before incurring significant cleanup costs. John E.
Sullivan, Implied Private Causes of Action and the Recoverability of Damages Under the
RCRA Citizen Suit Provision, 25 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,408, 104,20 (1995).
67. Joseph E. Lees, An Alternative for Private Cost Recovery?, 12 ENvTL. COMPLIANCE &
LITIG. STRATEGY No. 1, June 1996, at 4.
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Preventing future harm is RCRA's primary goal; giving landowners incentives
to delay cleanup action undermines this goal. Although the Court states that
RCRA "was designed to provide a remedy that ameliorates present or obviates
the risk of future 'imminent' harms,""8 the Court's holding impedes this end.69
B. Impeding RCRA Enforcement
Meghrig impedes RCRA enforcement by hindering cooperation between
environmental administrators and landowners. The Court's decision pits the EPA
Administrator charged with accomplishing the goals of RCRA against the
innocent landowner trying to mitigate costs. However, these parties should be on
the "same side"-both presumably have the same interest in the proper cleanup
of the contaminated property. Unfortunately, the Court's resolution makes these
parties into adversaries. Administrators issue an environmental cleanup order
expecting prompt action. Conversely, innocent landowners expect not to pay for
contamination caused by third parties. These landowners are left with the choice
of complying with the order and getting "stuck" with the costs, or delaying any
action and violating the law.7" Since the parties' goals are incompatible, this
arrangement fosters hostility between the two groups.
Further, by creating this gulf between the two entities, the Court slows the
entire remediation process. No landowner will quickly comply with an EPA order
knowing that his or her remediation costs cannot be recovered without first going
to court. Devising a system where innocent landowners and RCRA
administrators could work together in finding responsible parties and cleaning
up contamination would better serve the objectives of RCRA. However, Meghrig
makes this cooperation impossible.
68. Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1251, 1255 (1996).
69. Ironically, the Eighth Circuit previously has stated that requiring parties to file and
prosecute a RCRA action while endangerment exists would be an "'absurd and unnecessary'
requirement." United States v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1383 (8th Cir. 1989).
In Aceto, the EPA and the State of Iowa spent ten million dollars to clean up a highly
contaminated pesticide formulation facility. The EPA then attempted to recover its costs under
RCRA and CERCLA. The Eighth Circuit remanded the case for further review, but indicated
that the EPA could claim its remediation costs in the district court.
70. A property owner faced with an EPA remediation order must comply within a certain
time frame or risk monetary penalties. See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(1), (3) (1994) ("[T]he
Administrator may issue an order assessing a civil penalty for any past or current violation [of
RCRA], requiring compliance immediately or within a specified time period .... Any penalty
assessed in the order shall not exceed $25,000 per day of noncompliance for each violation of
a requirement of this subtitle. .. ."); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(c) (1994) ("If a violator fails to take
corrective action within the time specified in a compliance order, the Administrator may assess
a civil penalty of not more than $25,000 for each day of continued noncompliance with the
order ....").
19971
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C. Fairness to the Individual Landowner
Meghrig raises serious questions of equity and fairness. The Court's decision
punishes innocent landowners who, in a timely way, willingly comply with the
government's orders to remediate contamination on their land. Such landowners
often first obey environmental orders, only later to investigate the possibilities
for cost recovery. In 'addition to the negative effects on RCRA's goals and
enforcement, denying a reimbursement remedy cannot be justified in terms of
fairness to the individual landowners.
Landowners like the Furrers and KFC are victims. They own land contaminated
by hazardous waste, but neither knew of, nor contributed, to that contamination.
After Meghrig, these landowners have only two choices when faced with an EPA
remediation order: clean up the property out of their own pocket or face fines and
jail time for the contamination caused by others. This result is unjust and
intolerable.
Further exacerbating this inequity, the Supreme Court unfairly targets only one
particular subset of unfortunate landowners-those persons who own petroleum
contaminated property. After RCRA's enactment, Congress created CERCLA,
another environmental statute which addresses concerns similar to those in
RCRA. 7' Unlike RCRA, CERCLA explicitly provides that citizens may recover
past cleanup costs: "[a]ny person may seek contribution from any other person
who is liable or potentially liable" for cleanup CoStS. 72 However, this CERCLA
provision applies only to the cleanup of "hazardous substances," and CERCLA
specifically excludes petroleum from that definition.73 Therefore, landowners like
KFC and the Furrers have no recovery rights under CERCLA. Had the
contamination been almost any other hazardous substance, these landowners
could bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f). However, landowners like KFC are
denied monetary recovery simply because a third party deposited one substance,
rather than another, on their property.
If landowners like KFC and the Furrers have no avenue of recovery under
RCRA or CERCLA, their only recovery option is in state court under common
law theories of nuisance or trespass. Since recovering on these theories may be
difficult due to proof problems and differing state standards,74 landowners like
71. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1994). In addition to this cost recovery provision, CERCLA
provides a citizen suit provision which mirrors that in § 6972. 42 U.S.C. § 9659(c) (1994).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1994) ("The term [hazardous substance] does not include
petroleum....").
74. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 13, at 84
(5th ed. 1984). Also, both the majority and dissent in KFC Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d
518 (9th Cir. 1995), mention the difficulties in recovering under state law claims. The majority
states, "tort remedies are generally inadequate because of the difficulties in proof and attendant
court delays." Id at 513 n.6. In his dissent, Judge Brunetti agrees that restitution actions may
be necessary due to the landowner's inability to recover under CERCLA or state schemes.
However, Brunetti is unwilling to advance this position when the legislature has not decreed
it. Id. at 528 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
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the Furrers and KFC may never recover expended costs. Thus, these landowners
may be left without any remedy merely due to the nature of the contaminant on
their land. Allowing owners of land contaminated by various hazardous
substances to recover remediation costs while forcing owners of petroleum
contaminated land to bear their costs is illogical and unfair.
Citizen suit provisions, by nature, should protect the innocent. When
landowners like KFC and the Furrers are denied recovery under federal law, and
fail to sustain a cause of action under state law, the result is that the innocent pay
while the guilty get a "free ride." Statutes like RCRA and CERCLA should
operate to prevent future and remedy past environmental harms, not to punish
individual landowners. However, Meghrig effectively penalizes these innocent
and compliant landowners.
D. Judicial Inefficiency and Shifted Responsibility
Meghrig also wastes valuable judicial resources by forcing owners of
petroleum contaminated land to resort to state court remedies. These owners
often must first go to federal court for an injunction against the party
contaminating their land. However, if the responsible parties are not readily
ascertainable, or are not ordered to remediate the contamination, innocent
landowners who wish to timely comply with the government's order must clean
up the land themselves. After complying with the federal RCRA order, the
landowners must bring suit in state court to recover costs. This process results
in judicial inefficiency; plaintiffs end up in two different courts for one
environmental problem.
In addition, when innocent landowners are subjected to the costs of complying
with a federal statute without a chance for federal remedy, the federal
government improperly shifts responsibility to the state courts. As originally
enacted, RCRA granted the authority merely to enforce a RCRA regulation or
environmental order. In 1984, Congress amended the RCRA citizen suit
provision, and broadened the available remedies by allowing the courts to "take
such other action as may be necessary." Although Congress failed explicitly to
provide a federal right to monetary recovery in the 1984 amendment, Meghrig
closes off any possibility for a federal right, and forces landowners like KFC and
the Furrers into the state courts to recover expended costs. 7 5 However, Congress
acts irresponsibly by enforcing a federal statute which often may result in a state
court remedy. State courts must then take on the inevitably difficult task of
interpreting and applying federal law. Given the already burdensome caseload in
state courts, this result is undesirable; our judicial system simply does not
75. Ironically, RCRA's legislative history indicates that Congress intended RCRA to
"incorporateol the legal theories used for centuries to assess liability for creating a public
nuisance... [and to] determinel- appropriate remedies." REPORT, supra note 2, at 31. If RCRA
is such an interpretation, landowners should not have to pursue a state nuisance claim to
recover cleanup costs; this cause of action should be part of the federal scheme. Although the
legislative history appears contradictory, innocent landowners should not bear the burden of
this confusion. Federal causes of action must come equipped with complete and fair federal
remedies.
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contemplate hampering state courts with this responsibility. Thus, if Congress
creates a federal statute, federal courts should have jurisdiction over the cause
of action and all resulting remedies. However, Meghrig precludes this result, and
improperly shifts responsibility for awarding environmental cleanup costs from
federal to state courts.
E. Citizen Suits Versus Government Suits
The same standards of liability should govern both RCRA citizen suits and
government actions due to their substantially similar wording. In RCRA,
Congress created two suit provisions with almost parallel wording-one for
citizens and one for EPA Administrators acting on behalf of the United States
government.76 The legislative history of RCRA suggests that Congress intended
to provide the same standards of liability for the two provisions. When
commenting on the RCRA citizen suit amendment, the Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works stated: "[t]hese amendments are intended to
allow citizens exactly the same broad substantive and procedural claim for relief
which is already available to the United States under section [6973]."' Although
some courts have indicated that the EPA may recover its prior cleanup
expenditures, Meghrig makes similar treatment for private citizens impossible.
A few courts have suggested that an EPA Administrator or governmental entity
may recover past cleanup costs under § 6973. In United States v. Price,7" the
Third Circuit indicated that awarding response costs was appropriate in some
circumstances. In Price, the Prices owned a landfill for nineteen years. Although
the Prices' license to operate the landfill specifically prohibited the disposal of
soluble or liquid industrial wastes at the site, the Prices accepted hazardous waste
for disposal at the site. The Prices later sold the land to AGA Partnership, which
was unaware of the contamination. 9 AGA subsequently discovered on their
property contaminants in quantities "likely to create grave hazards to human
health."80 The United States, on behalf of the EPA, applied for a preliminary
injunction to require defendants to fund a study of the land and to provide an
alternate water supply for nearby landowners.8' The Third Circuit affirmed the
district court's denial of an injunction stating, "it may well be that the public
interest counseled against the grant of the requested preliminary relief.... [T]he
76. 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) provides in part:
[T]he Administrator may bring suit on behalf of the United States in the
appropriate district court against any person ... who has contributed or who is
contributing to such handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal to
restrain such person... to order such person to take such other action as may be
necessary, or both.
42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
77. S. REP. No. 98-284, at 56 (1983); see also H.R. REP. No. 98-198, at 53 (1983) (stating
that RCRA confers on citizens a right under § 6972 to sue pursuant to the standards of liability
established under § 6973).
78. 688 F.2d 204 (3rd Cir. 1982).
79. Id. at 208-09.
80. Id. at 209.
81. Id. at 207-08.
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most practical and effective solution may well have been to refuse the
government's request for a preliminary injunction thereby necessitating the study
be undertaken by EPA without delay."82 However, the court went on to explain:
"Prompt preventive action was the most important consideration.
Reimbursement could thereafter be directed against those parties ultimately
found to be liable."83
Although the Price court qualified its holding by restricting the award of
money payments to situations where the payments are needed to abate a present
hazard, 4 subsequent decisions indicate that courts may grant past response costs
to governmental entities as well. For example, in United States v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co.,"5 the Eighth Circuit seemed to authorize the
award of past cleanup costs to governmental entities. The court determined that
on remand, "the district court could grant the government recovery of [past
response] costs as a matter of equitable discretion."86
These lower court decisions imply that governmental entities like the EPA may
recover past remediation costs under § 6973. However, Meghrig eliminates that
restitutionary remedy for citizens. Closing off a restitutionary recovery for
private citizens, but leaving that option open to government entities in a
substantially similar provision, is unreasonable. The wording of the two
provisions-one for private citizens and one for government entities-parallel;
consequently, so should the standards for liability. The Third Circuit's words,
"[p]rompt preventative action was the most important consideration""T apply to
all parties affected by RCRA regulations. Whether potential plaintiffs are private
citizens or administrative bodies, RCRA's primary goal should be the
expeditious remediation of contaminated land. However, the Supreme Court's
decision thwarts that goal.
Some may argue that Meghrig implicitly overrules Price and Northeastern
Pharmaceuticals. However, the Court failed to address government entities, and
presumably leaves these precedents in place. Therefore, until the Court faces this
issue, Meghrig creates an inequitable gap between treatment of citizens and
administrators under substantially the same statutory provisions.
Although the Supreme Court determined that no private right to restitution of
past cleanup costs exists under § 6972, policy and fairness considerations
remain. Consequently, Meghrig cannot be the last word on the RCRA citizen suit
provision controversy.
82. Id. at 214.
83. Id. at 214 (emphasis added).
84. Id.
85. 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1985).
86. Id at 750 (8th Cir. 1985); see also United States v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d
1373 (8th Cir. 1988) (remanding the case to district court, thereby allowing the EPA to seek
recovery of their remediation costs).
87. Price, 688 F.2d at 214.
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F. Some Suggested Options for Landowners
Some commentators note that there is light at the end of the tunnel for
individual land purchasers. First, future buyers can engage in environmental
planning techniques to avoid liability problems. Today, most buyers perform
environmental audits, or site assessments, on land prior to purchase to better
inform themselves of potential liabilities. The EPA defines an environmental
audit as a "systematic, documented, periodic and objective review by regulated
entities of facility operations and practices related to meeting environmental
requirements.""8 In layman's terms, an audit is a voluntary self-evaluation
conducted for the purpose of determining a property's compliance with the
environmental laws.89 Audits provide a buyer-and often a financial
lender-information for evaluating whether to complete a real estate
transaction.90 If environmental contamination surfaces, the buyer may require the
existing owner to clean up before sale.9'
Although future buyers may avoid KFC's plight by engaging in these pre-
transaction assessments, this "solution" does not apply to the problem at hand.
Landowners like KFC and the Furrers already possess contaminated land; often,
these landowners purchased their land prior to the 1970s when environmental
planning techniques became popular. Further, many non-corporate buyers-the
"mom and pop" enterprise-simply will not engage in these costly and technical
pre-transaction measures. Therefore, environmental audits cannot solve KFC's
and the Furrers' problems. Other options for these landowners are necessary.
Second, Meghrig itself may leave an exception for some landowners to recover
costs under § 6972. In Meghrig, the Supreme Court explicitly refused to decide
the issue "whether a private party could seek to obtain an injunction requiring
another party to pay cleanup costs which arise after a RCRA citizen suit has been
properly commenced." 2 By intentionally leaving this issue open, the Court
indicates that if contamination is present when a suit is filed, and the landowner
begins cleanup only after the suit is filed, the owner may recover those
remediation costs. However, the Court's failure to address this issue in Meghrig
does not mean that it will not preclude this type of recovery in the future. Given
the Court's strong assertion that § 6972 fails to provide any private right to
monetary damages, this recovery avenue likely has limited availability. Again,
this type of preventative measure can no longer help KFC and the Furrers,
landowners who already have complied with the environmental cleanup orders.
These parties already failed to bring suit before complying with their
environmental cleanup order. Ultimately, neither proposed "solution" adequately
88. Incentives for Self Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of
Violations, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706, 66,710 (1995).
89. Robert W. Parnacott, Compliance Through Cooperation, 65 J. KAN. B. ASS'N, June-
July 1996, at 22, 23.
90. John M. Scagnelli, Environmental Issues and Liability Considerations 607, 617 (PLI
Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 946, 1990).
91. Id.
92. Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1251, 1256 (1996).
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addresses KFC's and the Furrers' situation. Landowners who already possess
contaminated land, and have complied with an environmental cleanup order, still
need relief. Site assessments, environmental audits, and pre-cleanup lawsuits
cannot be the answer for these landowners.
IV. THE FUTURE: A NEW LOOK AT RCRA
Landowners like KFC and the Furrers can only be saved by reform of the
existing RCRA legislation. Although Meghrig ignores overriding equitable
concerns and adopts a strict statutory approach to § 6972, the fact remains that
RCRA-in its present form-has overstayed its welcome. Therefore, present
landowners and citizens must challenge the existing legislation and call for
RCRA reform.
In the last thirty years, public awareness of and indignation about
environmental problems has increased dramatically. In response, legislators often
quickly drafted and hurriedly passed environmental legislation in order to quell
the public uproar.93 However, legislators, administrators, and citizens now realize
inherent difficulties in many of these furiously drafted environmental schemes.94
Similarly, the executive branch has recognized the need for change in the
existing environmental laws. Kathleen McGinty, head of the White House
Council on Environmental Quality, has noted that the legislative reform of
Superfund and RCRA is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the programs.9"
Existing environmental laws, particularly the RCRA citizen suit provision,
must change. However, Congress has yet to take any action towards reforming
§ 6972. Although the Supreme Court failed to address the equitable problems
raised by the Meghrig dispute, Congress need not make the same mistake. To
avoid overriding inequities in the existing RCRA citizen suit provision, Congress
93. One example of Congress hurriedly passing legislation is the quick drafting of
CERCLA in December of 1980 after the "Love Canal" investigation. A hazardous waste site
was discovered in the Love Canal neighborhood of Niagara Falls, New York. In the ensuing
months, health officials discovered numerous other hazardous waste sites around the country.
It quickly became apparent that local governments did not have the capability to respond to
problems created by unsafe hazardous waste disposal, and that existing federal environmental
laws were unsatisfactory. In response, Congress quickly drafted CERCLA. See Albert Bates
Jr. IV & Timothy C. Wolfson, An Overview of the Integration of RCRA 's Imminent Hazard
Citizen Suit Provision with CERCLA's Cost Recovery Provisions After KFC Westem v.
Meghrig, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 51, at 2550 (Apr. 28, 1995); Gerald B. Silverman, Love
Canal: A Retrospective, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 835 (Sept. 15, 1989).
94. For example, Superfund reform recently has been a topic of hot debate. In the years
since Superfund's enactment, dissatisfaction with the statute has grown. For discussion of the
Superfund reform debate, see generally Superfund: Senate Reform Bill Could Lower Barriers
to Brownfields Redevelopment, GAO Says, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 542 (July 5, 1996);
Superfund: Bills Would Give States Brownfield Cleanup Grants, Reinstate Expired Federal
Superfund Tax Until 2001, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 837 (Aug. 9, 1996); Superfund:
Oxley Reform Bill Does Not Go Far Enough for Small Businesses, House Committee Told, 26
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 1131-35 (Oct. 27, 1995) [hereinafter Oxley Reform Bill].
95. Federal Facilities: Superfund, RCRA Reforms in Congress Called Key Factor in
Meeting Cleanup Goals, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 1085-86 (Oct. 20, 1995).
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must revise RCRA to allow landowners like KFC and the Furrers to recover
environmental remediation costs from responsible parties. This "new" RCRA
should include a provision, similar to that in CERCLA, which allows for
restitution of past environmental cleanup costs. Alternatively, Congress should
dispel the petroleum exemption from CERCLA. Further, RCRA should contain
an "imminent" danger provision which refers to the time of cleanup, not the time
of filing. Only by taking these steps can Congress eliminate the equitable
problems left unresolved by Meghrig.
Congress enacted RCRA to advance the expeditious disposal of existing
hazardous waste in order to minimize present and future threats to human health
and the environment. Although cleaning up environmental contamination
certainly is an important objective, this goal cannot be carried out at any cost.
Congress must now consider the equitable implications of Meghrig, and fashion'
its environmental legislation accordingly. Innocent citizens simply cannot
become the environmental scapegoats of legislative policy.
CONCLUSION
By denying a private right of recovery for expended environmental costs under
RCRA § 6972, Meghrig obstructs RCRA's purposes, punishes innocent and
compliant landowners, hinders cooperation between government agencies and
citizens, wastes judicial resources, improperly shifts responsibility from federal
to state courts, and unfairly distinguishes between government and private actors
in like circumstances. In light of these overriding equitable considerations,
RCRA reform is necessary.
Environmental policy must embrace the fundamental concepts of responsibility
and accountability; responsible parties must pay for their own environmental
mistakes and cannot be allowed to slip through the cracks of § 6972. As stated
by Lois Shiffer, assistant attorney general for the Environmental and Natural
Resources Division of the Justice Department, it is "very American to have
polluters pay for [their own] cleanups."96 Therefore, RCRA should continue to
advance the prompt remediation of contaminated property. However, it no longer
may serve that purpose at the expense of innocent landowners. The Meghrigs
must pay up.
96. Oxley Reform Bill, supra note 94, at 1132.
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